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A contract for the use of a wharf by the master or owner of a vessel is a maritime contract, and as such cognizable in admiralty.
Such a contract, whether express or implied, if the vessel is a foreign one, or
belongs to a port of another state, gives rise to a maritime lien against the vessel,
which may be enforced by a proceeding in rem or by a suit in personam against the
owner.
While there is no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to issue a writ
of prohibition to the District Court, when proceeding as a court of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, yet the facts upon which the court is to act must appear in
the record.
PETITION for writ of prohibition to restrain the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding in ren, to enforce an alleged lien
for wharfage. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion
of the court.

J. B. Gowen, for the petition.
F'. A. Wilcox, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Judicial power under the federal constitution
extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and it
was doubtless the intention of Congress, by the ninth section of the
Judiciary Act, to confer upon the -District Court the exclusive
original cognizance of all admiralty and maritime causes, the words
of the act being in terms exactly co-extensive with the power conferred by the constitution. In order, therefore, to determine the
limits of the admiralty jurisdiction, it becomes necessary to ascertain the true interpretation of the constitutional grant. On that
subject three propositions may be assumed as settled by authority,
and to those it will be sufficient to refer, on the present occasion,
without much.discussion of the principles on which the adjudications rest: 1. That the jurisdiction of the district courts is not
limited to the particular subjects over which the admiralty courts
of the parent country exercised jurisdiction when our constitution
was adopted; 2. That the jurisdiction of those courts does not
extend to all cases which would fall within such jurisdiction
according to the civil law and the practice and usages of conti-
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nental Europe; 3. That the nature and extent of the admiralty
jurisdiction conferred by the constitution must be'determined by
the laws of Congress and the decisions of this court, and by the
usages prevailing in the courts of the states at the time the federal
constitution was adopted. No other rules are known which it is
reasonable to suppose could have been in the minds of the framers
of the constitution than those which were then in force in the
respective states, and which they were accustomed to see in daily
and familiar practice in the state courts.
Authority is conferred upon the libellants as the proprietors of
the wharf and slip in question by the law of the state to charge and
collect wharfage and dockage of vessels lying at said wharf and
within the slip adjoining the wharf of the libellants.
Sufficient appears to show that the respondents are the owners
of the barge named in the libel; that on the 10th of October 1876,
she completed a trip from the port of Baltimore for the port
of New York, and that she took wharfage at the wharf or
pier of the libellants, where she remained for eleven days.
For the use of the berth occupied by the barge the libellants
charged $34.20 as wharfage and dockage. Due demand was made,
and payment being refused the libellants instituted the present
suit, which is a libel in rem, against the barge to recover the amount
of that charge. Process was served, and the respondents appeared
and excepted to the libel, and set up that process of condemnation
should not issue against the barge for the following reasons: 1.
Because no maritime lien arises in the case for the matters set forth
in the libel. 2. Because no lien in such a case is given for wharfage against boats or vessels by the laws of the state. 3. Because
the law of the state referred to in the libel as giving a lien for
wharfage is unconstitutional and void for the flblowing reasons: 1.
Because it imposes a restriction on commerce. 2. Because it imposes a duty of tonnage on all vessels of the character and description of that of the respondents. 3. Because it discriminates
against the boats or barges of persons who are not citizens of the
state where the proprietors of the wharf reside.
Pending the proceedings in the District Court, the respondents
presented a petition here asking leave to mo;e this court for a prohibition to the court below, forbidding the Distirict Court to proceed further in the case. Pursuant to said petition, this court entered an order permitting argument upon the merits of the petition,
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and directing that due notice be given to the libellants and the
clerk of the District Court. Hearing was had in conformity to
that order, and the case was held under advisement.
Power. is certainly vested in the Supreme Court to issue the writ
of prohibition to the District Court when that court is proceeding in
a case of admiralty and maritime cognizance of which the District
Court has no jurisdiction : 1 Stat. at Large 81; United States v.
-Peters,3 Dall. 129. Where the District Court is proceeding in a
cause not of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
cannot issue the writ, nor can the writ be used except to prevent
the doing of something about to be done, nor will it ever be issued
for acts already completed: Ex arte Christy, 3 How. 292; Unzited
States v. Hoffman, 4 Wall. 158.
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution, and Judge STORY says it embraces two great classes of
cases-one dependent upon locality, and the other upon the nature
of the contract. Damage claims arising from acts and injuries done
-within the ebb and flow of-the tide have always been considered as
cognizable in the admiralty, and since the decision in the case of the
"aenesee Chief, it is considered to be equally well settled that remedies
for acts and injuries done on public navigable waters, not within the
ebb and flow of the tide, may be enforced in the admiralty as well
as for those upon the high seas and upon the coast of the sea.
Speaking of the second great class of cases cognizable in the
admiralty, Judge STORY says, in effect, that it embraces all contracts, claims and services which are purely maritime, and which
respect rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation:
2 Story Const., sect. 1666. Public navigable waters, where interstate or foreign. commerce may be carried on, of course include the
high seas, which comprehend, in the commercial sense, all tide
waters to high-water mark. Maritime jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts in cases of contracts depends chiefly upon the nature of the
service or engagement, and is limited to such subjects as are purely
maritime, and have respect to commerce and navigation within the
meaning of the constitution.
Wide differences of opinion have existed as to the extent of the
admiralty jurisdiction, but it may now be said, without fear of contradiction, that it extends to all contracts, claims and services
essentially maritime, among which are bottomry bonds, contracts
of affreightment, and contracts for the conveyance of passengers,
VOL. XXVI.-54
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pilotage on the high seas, wharfage, agreements of consortship, surveys of vessels damaged by the perils of the seas, the claims of mtteriahnen and others for the repair and outfit of ships belonging to
forci gn nations or to other states, and the wages of mariners, and
also to civil marine torts and injuries, among which are assaults
or other personal injuries, collision, spoliation and damage, illegal
seizures or other depredations on property, illegal dispossession or
withholding of possession from the owners of ships, controversies
between the part owners as to the employment of ships, municipal
seizures of ships, and cases of salvage and marine insurance:
Conkl. Treatise, 5th ed., 254.
Wharf accommodation is a necessity of navigation, and such
accommodations are indispensable for ships and vessels and watercraft of every name and description, whether employed in carrying
freight or passengers, or engaged in the fisheries. Erections of the
kind are constructed to enable ships, vessels and all sorts of watercraft to lie in port in safety, and to facilitate their operation in
loading and unloading cargo, and in receiving and landing passen-.
gers. Piers or wharves are a necessary incident to every well-regulated port, without which commerce and navigation would be
subjected to great inconvenience, and be exposed to vexatious delay
and constant peril. Conveniences of the kind are wanted both at
the port of departure and at the place of destination, and the expenses paid at both are everywhere regarded as properly chargeable as expenses of the voyage. Commercial privileges of the kind
cannot be enjoyed where neither wharves nor piers exist, and it is
not reasonable to suppose that such erections will be constructed
for general convenience unless the proprietors are allowed to make
reasonable charges for their use.
Compensation for wharfage may be claimed upon an express or
an implied contract, according to the circumstances. Where a
price is agreed upon for the use of the wharf, the contract furnishes
the measure of compensation, and when the wharf is used without
any such agreement the contract is implied, and the proprietor is
entitled to recover what is just and reasonable foi the use of his
property and the benefit conferred.
Such erections are indispensably necessary for the safety and
convenience of commerce and navigation, and those who take berth
alongside them to secure those objects derive great benefit from
their use. All experience supports that proposition, and shows to
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a demonstration that the contract of the wharfinger appertains to
the pursuit of commerce and navigation.
Instances may, doubtless, be referred to where wharves are
erected as sites for stores and storehouses, but the great and usual
object of such erections is to advance commerce and navigation by
furnishing resting places for ships, vessels and all kinds of watercraft, and to facilitate their operation in loading and unloading
cargo, and in receiving and landing passengers.
Nor is the nature of the service or the character of the contract changed by the circumstance that the water-craft which derived
-the benefit in the case before the court was without masts or sails
or other motive power of her own. Sail-ships, and even steamships and vessels, are frequently propelled by tugs, and yet, if they
secure a berth at a wharf or in a slip at the place of landing or at
the port of destination, and actually occupy the berth as a restingplace or for the purpose of loading or unloading, no one, it is supposed, will deny that the ship or vessel is just as much liable to the
wharfinger as if she had. been propelled by her own motive power.
Neither canal boats nor barges ordinarily have sails or steampower, but they usually have tow-lines, and it clearly cannot make
any difference, as to their liability for wharfage, whether they are
propelled by steam or sails of their own, or by tugs or horse- or
mule-power, if it appears that the boat or barge actually occupied a
berth at the wharf or slip at the commenceifient or close of the trip
as a resting-place,.or for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo,
or for receiving or landing passengers. Goods to a vast amount
are transported by such means of conveyance, and all experience
shows that b6ats of the kind require wharf privileges as well as
ships and vessels or any other water-craft engaged in navigationThe Northern Belle, 9 Wall. 328.
Access'to the ship or vessel rightfully occupying a berth at a
wharf, for the purpose of lading and unlading, is the undoubted
right of the owner or charterer of such ship or vessel for which
such right has been secured: Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray 496.
Privileges of the kind are essential to the carrier by water,
whether he is engaged in carrying goods or passengers.
Repairs to a limited extent are sometimes made at the wharf,
but contracts of the kind usually have respect to the voyage, and
are made to secure a resting-place for the vessel during the time
she is being loaded or unloaded. Such contracts beyond all doubt
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are maritime, as they have respect to commerce and navigation,
and are for the benefit of the ship or vessel when afloat.
Carrying vessels would be of little or no value, unless they
could be loaded, and they are usually loaded from the wharf,
except in a limited class of cases where lighters are employed, the
vessel being unable to come up to the wharf .in consequence of the
shoalness of the water.
Accommodations at the port of destination are equally indispensable for the voyage as those at the port of departure. Consignments of goods and passengers must be landed, else the carrier is
not entitled to freight or fare. Where the contract is to carry from
port to port, an actual delivery of the goods into the possession of
the owner or consignee or at his warehouse is not required in order
to discharge the carrier from his liability. He may deliver them
on the wharf, but to constitute a valid delivery there, the master
should give due and reasonable notice to the consignee, so as to
afford him a fair opportunity to remove the goods or to put them
under proper care and custody. Delivery.on the wharf, under such
circumstances, is valid, if the different consignments be properly
separated, so as to be open to -inspection and conveniently accessible to.their respective owners: The Eddy, 5 Wall. 495.
These remarks are sufficient to show that wharves, piers' or
landing-places are well nigh as essential to commerce as ships and
vessels, and are abundantly sufficient to demonstrate that the contract for' wharfage is a maritime contract, for which, if the vessel
or water-craft is a foreign one or belongs to the port of a state other
than the one where the wharf is situated, a maritime lien arises
against the ship or vessel in favor of the proprietor of the wharf.
Standard authorities, as well as reason, principle and the necessities of commerce, support the theory that the contract for wharfage is a maritime contract, which in the case supposed gives to the
proprietor of the wharf a maritime lien on the ship or vessel for
his security. From an.early period wharf-owners have been allowed
to exact from ships and vessels using a berth at their wharves, a
reasonable compensation for the use of the same, and the ship or yessel enjoying such a privilege has always been accustomed to pay
to the proprietor of such wharf a reasonable compensation for the
use of the berth: The Kate Tremaine, 5 Ben. 611. Ancient
codes and treaties, such as are frequently recognised as the source
from which the rules of the maritime law are drawn, usually

-

EX PARTE EASTON.

treat such contracts as maritime contracts, for which the ship or
vessel is liable: The Maggic Hammond, 9 Wall. 452; De Lovio
v. Boit, 2 Gall. 472.
Charges for wharfage were adjudged to be lien claims in the
District Court of the Third Circuit more than seventy years ago, and
in speaking of that case, Judge STORY says that. it seems to him

that the decision was fully supported in principle by the doctrines
as well of the common. law as of the civil law, and by the analogous
cases of materials furnished and repairs made upon the ship: AS ip
New Jersey, 1 Pet. Adm. 228; Ex parte Lewis, 2 Gall. 484,
where it was expressly adjudged that the contract was necessarily
maritime, giving as the reason for the conclusion that the use of
the wharf is indispensable for the preservation of the vessel: ohnson v.lMiDonough, Gilpin 103.
Other eminent admiralty judges have decided in the same way,
and among the number the late Judge WARE, whose opinion in
cases involving the question of admiralty jurisdiction is entitled to
the highest respect: The Phebe, Ware 341; 2 Conkl. Adm., 2d
ed., 515; Bark Alaska, 3 Ben. 392; Hobartv. Drogan, 10 Pet.
120; The Mercer, 1 Sprague 284; The Ann _yan, 7 Ben.
21; Dunlap Adm. 75; Abbott on Ship, 5th ed., 423.
Water-craft of all kinds necessarily lie at a wharf when loadin-g
and unloading, and Mr. Benedict says that the pecuniary charge
for the use of the dock or wharf is called wharfage or dockage, and
that is the subject of admiralty jurisdiction; that the master and
owner of the ship and the ship herself may be proceeded against in
admiralty to enforce the payment of wharfage, when the vessel lies
alongside the wharf or at a distance, and only uses the wharf temporarily for boats or cargo: Benedict Adm., 2 ed., sect. 283.
Application for the writ of prohibition is properly made in such
a case upon the ground that the District Court has transcended its
jurisdiction in entertaining the described proceeding, and whether
it has or not must depend not upon facts stated dehors the record,
but upon those stated in the record upon which the District Court is
called to act, and by which alone it can regulate its judgment.
Mere matters of defence, whether going to oust the jurisdiction of
the court or to establish the want of merits in the libellants' case,
cannot be admitted under such a petition here to displace the right
of the District Court to entertain suits, the rule being that every such
matter should be propounded by suitable pleadings as a defence for
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the consideration of the court, and to be supported by competent
proofs, provided the case is one within the jurisdiction of the District
Court: Ex parte Jllrity, 3 How. 308.
Congress has empowered the Supreme Court to issue writs of
prohibition to the district courts "when proceeding as courts of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," by which it is understood
that the power is limited to a proceeding in admiralty: Conkl.
Treatise, 5th ed., 56. Such a writ is issued to forbid a subordinate
court to proceed in a cause there depending on suggestion that the
cognizance thereof belongeth not to the court: F. N. B. 39 ; 3 B1.
Com. 112; 2 Pars. on Ship. 193; 3 Bac. Abr. 206.
Viewed in the light of these considerations, it is clear that a contract for the use of a wharf by the master or owner of a ship or
vessel is a maritime contract, and as such it is cognizable in the
admiralty; that such a contract being one made exclusively for the
benefit of the ship or vessel, a maritime lien in the case supposed
arises in favor of the proprietor of the wharf against the vessel for
payment of reasonable and customary charges in that behalf for the
use of the wharf, and that the same may be enforced by a proceeding. in rem against the vessel, .or by-a suit in personam against the
owner.
Many other questions were discussed at the bar which will not
be decided at the present time, as they are not properly involved in
the application before the court.
Petition for prohibition denied.
A maritime lien depends neither upon
possession nor the right of possession.
Far from contemplating either, the
maritime law confers a lien for supplies,
repairs or bottomry, because they give
the ship strength and speed to pursue
her course, a lien not followed by the
right of possession except by virtue of
a judicial decree, "a right which enables a creditor to institute a suit totake
a thing from any one who may possess
it and subject it by a sale to the payment of his debts, which so inheres in
the thing as to accompany it into whosesoever hands it may pass by a sale,
which is not divested by a forfeiture, or
mortgage, or other encumbrance created
by the debtor, can only be ajus in re in

contradistinction to ajus ad rem, or in
contradistinction to a mere personal
right or privilege.
Though tacitly
created by the law, and to be executed
only by the aid of a court of justice,
and resulting in a judicial sale, it is as
really a property, in the thing as the
right of a pledge or the lien of a builder
for work :" The Young Mchanic, 2
Curt. 406. See also The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore P. C. Cases 267 ; and
The Brig Nestor, I Sumner 83.
At common law a wharfinger was
allowed a lien, among other reasons,
because any vessel that chose being
licensed to use his wharf it was thought
fair to ensure his compensation. But
this lien like all others at common law
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waq lost by loss of possession, unless
held to be maintained constructively,
lcrauc the possession had been fraudulently changed.
ln England the courts of common
law waged a war as jealous and more
sucecessful against the admiralty than
against chancery. They were stimulated
not only by the natural desire to enlarge
their own phylacteries, but by their dislike of processes akin to those of the
civil law. By an oppressive construetion of the statutes of Richard II.
defining its jurisdiction they confined
the admiralty to torts done and contracts
made and to be performed upon the high
seas. All other maritime euses fell into
the common law and a very curious experience they underwent in the new
forunm. Because, although the courts
of common law admitted the principles
of the maritime law iu such cases, yet
they were unable to provide a remedy,
having no processes to enforce a lien unaccompanied by posse-sion.
By the
statutes 3 & 4 Vict. C. 65 and 24
Viet. 10, the juri~divtion of the admiralty has been greatly extended.
In section 2 of article 3 of the constitution the judicial power of the
United States was extended "to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and it became at once a
mooted question whether the jurisdiction intended was that exercised, at
the time of our separation, by the admiralty in England, dwarfed by the jealousy of the common law, or whether it
was the liberal jurisdiction of all causes
really maritime, as allowed to the admiralty in other commercial nations.
This question was set at rest by Judge
STORY, in the learned case of De Lovio
v. Bolt, 2 Gall. 475, in which the clause
received the most liberal and comprehensive construction. "If we examine
the etymology or received use of the
words ' admiralty' and ' maritime jurisdiction,' we shall find that they include

jurisdiction of all things done upon and
relating to the sea." The conclusions
arrived at in this controversy are stated
by Mr. Justice CLrFORD in three propositions cit the beginning of the principal case.
The libel filed in the United States
District Court being bt rent, the petitioners in the Supreme Court would
have been entitled to the problibition,
if they could have established that
wharfage is not a maritime contract
conferring the right of lien.
Maritime contracts are classified into
those which are so because of locality
ani those which are so because of subject-matter. Wharfage, if a maritime
contract, must belong to the latter class,
which Judge STonRY, in see. 1666 of his
work on the constitution, says includes
"contracts, claims and services purely
maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation ;" and in sec. 1671, enumerating them more at length, "the claims
of materialmen and others for repairs
and outfits of ships belonging to foreign
nations or other states ; bottomnry bonds
for moneys lent to ships in foreign
ports, to relieve their distresses and enable them to complete their voyages;
surveys of vessels damaged by perils
of the seas ; pilotage on the high seas;
and suits for mariners' wages.,"
We are disposed to think that Mr.
Justice CLIFFOlRD'S vindication of the
usefulness of wharves and of the general doctrines of assumpsit alone would
not convince the reader that wharfage
is a maritime contract and entitled to a
lien, it being by no means true that all
services to ships, even when very useful
and deserving of compensation, are
maritime or entitled to maritime liens.
For instance, a stevedore has no lien
for discharging the cargo : The Antitel,
Blateh. & Howl. 215; McDcrmU v'.
Tie Owens, I Wall, Jr. 370. Nor are
lighterage or services in compressing
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the cargo for shipment entitled to a
lien: The Bark Joseph Cunard, Scott
Adm. 120. Nor has one employed to
watch and visit a ship at anchor, open
her hatches for ventilation and try her
pumps, a lien : Garney v. Crockett,
Abb. Adm. 490. Nor one employed to
scrape and clean the bottom of a ship in
any dock : Bradley v. Bolles, Id. 569.
Therefore, we shall proceed to consider
the cases cited by the court in support
of the judgment.
The father of them all is Gardner v.
The Ship New Jersey, I Pet. Adm. 223,
in whichl a ship's physician applied to
be paid out of the surplus proceeds
of the ship, wlich had been sold under
a decree upon a libel for seamen's wages
in the registry of the court. Judge
PETERS refused to do so on the ground
that no claim not a lien upon the ship
should be paid out of her proceeds. In
mentioning claims which should be so
paid, he said : " Wharfage has been
allowed out of proceeds, as the wharfinger might detain the ship until payment." This case is the first authority
upon the subject, and invariably referred
to, and it is curious that a remark entirely obiter, that .wharfage is a common-law lien, should have resulted in
a Supreme Court decision that it is a
maritime lien.
The next case is Ex parle Lewis, 2
Gall. 483, which was an application by
a wharfinger to be paid dockage out
of the proceeds of a ship in the registry,
which had been arrested while at his
wharf; under a decree of the admiralty,
and sold. Judge STORY, relying on
the former case, said it was a lien, but
that he also regarded it as a commonlaw lien may be seen from the case
cited, viz., Naylier v. Mangles, 1 Esp.
109, a case of assumpsit, in which Lord
KENTON decided that a wharfinger had
by usage a lien for the balance of a
general account upon goods deposited
on his wharf; Spears v. Bartley, 3 Esp.
81, a case of trover, in which Lord

ELDON applied the lien in favor of a
wharfinger to secure a balance of an
account harred by the Statute of Limit.
ations, and &tvill v. Ricurds, 4 Esp.
53, also trover, in which Lord KENYoN
sustained the lien in favor of a dyer.
Then comes the St. .Jagotie Citha, 9
Wheat. 418, also a claim upon proceeds,
in which JonNso., J., says: "There
is, however, one item in this account, to
the amount of three or four hundred
dollars, which is good against all the
world. This was for wharfage."
In .Johnsonv. The MeDonough, Gilpin
103, it was contended that the wharfinger had lost his lien, and, thercfore;his
right to be paid out of the proceeds, because the schooner had left his wharf
and gone to another before she was sold,
but Judge HOrKsNsoN said : "It

was

long since decided in this court by
Judge PETERS, that wharfage is allowed out of proceeds, as the wharfinger might detain the ship until payment;
in other words, that a wharfinger has a
lien upon the vessel for his wharfage.
Judge STORY, in the Case of L,zois, 2
Gall. 483, lhs recognised and affirmed
this principle. In this case it has not
been questioned, but it has been insisted
by the district attorney that the lien
was lost by the loss of the possession
of the schooner. It is certainly true
that when the possession of a chattel is
voluntarily given up, or other security
is taken for the debt, the lien is abandoned," and then he goes on to say that
the vessel having been removed without
the consent and against the protest of
the wharfinger it is not lost in this case.
Judge WARE, in The Phwebe, Ware

355, also allowed wharfage to be paid
out of the proceeds in the registry, speaking of the lien as one which would be
lost by loss of possession.
In none of the cases cited had there
been any proceeding in rem for wharfage
against the ship. They were simply
applications to share in the funds and
need not have been for that purpose
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maritime iight%, becal0e the admiralty
having taken juri.,ictio, of the res and
ctnvci ted it into nloev could enforce
the pUOcceds : Carryl
niOy lien ngaill-t
v. Thqlnr, 20 llw. 48:1.
In the ea-c of Th, (;(t ril Smith, 4
materiainan in the
Wheat. 438, a
state of Maryland having filed a libel
in rein again-t a donmestic ship, it was
objected that the commoo law, which
wiat the law of Maryland, did not recognise any lien apart fron poscssion for
supplie. furnished or repairs done to a
domestic ship. This view the court,
JudgC SToRY delivering the opinion,
.u-tained ol the ground that the ship
being a doinetic one the question of lien
mu-t be settled hy file miuicipal law.

forced in adniralty hy virtue of Iule 12,
hea-l'e it apldied only to liens given to
nlateri al ine, which a wharingir could
not be considered to be. Nor could it
be coonidered a maritime lien and en-

forceable as such, it being a lien at common law requiring possession, as had

been held by Mr. Justice STONY in Ex
pirte Lbis, %upra. '- Mr. Justice
STORY, who drew up these rules, makes
this distinction in Ex parte Lewis, 2
Gall. 483. But wharfage not being a
lien undcr the general maritibne law,
ant only such by the statute of the state,
the claim as regards tile occasional occupation of the Canada wharf, is only
enforceable as a cmnion-li, lihn. As
such, the wharfinger could detain the
vessel until payment, but if lie railed to
Thi was certainly following the common
law in a ,listinction between donietic do this and parted with his temporary
and foreign ships not recognised bi tile possession, his lien ceased, and such was
the ruling of Mr. Justice STORY, in the
maritime law further than might have
been expectel from one wlito had been
case already cited fiomn 2 Gallison."
mainly instrimiental in rejecting the
In 1859. Rule 12 was amended by
unreasonable limits it had put upon the substituting for the last sentence the foladmiralty. What was implied in this lowing : "And the like proceedings in
case, siz., that when the local law gave personam, but not in rein, shall apply to
a lien against domestic vessels it would cases of domestic ships for supplies,
be enforced in the federal courts, was repairs or other necessaries." This
positively decided in subsequent cases:
amendment was evidently made to cor7TI Cilisto, Davies 31 ; D.ais v. Child, rect the direction taken in the case of
Id. 78 ; Pi/lon v. loward, 7 Pet. 342;
The Gen'ail Smith, as clearly appears in
and iii accordance with these decisions 3Maguire v. Card, 21 How. 248.
all
was Admiralty Rule 12, 1844. 1 Iln
In the case of the Canal Boat Kale
Tremnaiie, 5 Ben. 60, a libel in rein had
suits hy inaterialen tfor supplies or
repairs or other necessaries for a foreign been filed for wharfage against a domesship or for a ship in a foreign port, the tic vessel, the local law conferring a
libellant may proceed against the ship lien for wharfage. Judge IEBNEDICT
or against the master took the ground that wharfage was, on
and freight in reim
orthe owner alone in personain. And the the authority of the cases cited above, a
like proceedings in ren shall apply to maritime contract conferring the right
cases ofdomestic ships where by the local of lien and as such enforceable in admiralty. A wharfinger not being a
law a lien is given to materialmen for
materialman, Rule 12 did not apply, and
supplies, repairs or other necessaries."
New- the decision resting upon the ground
In Russell v. The Asa It. Sift,
that wharfage was a lien by the mariberry 553, a wharfinger to whom the
time law, it was not necessary to discuss
local law gave a lien for wharfage had
the effect of the local law conferring a
proceeded in rem against the Asa R.
lien under th~e case of The GeneralSmith
Swift, a domestic vessel. The court
and admiralty Rule 12 as amended.
decided that this lien could not be enVOL. XXVI.-55

434

EX PARTE EASTON.

MCKENNAN, J., of the United States
Circuit Court, in the case of Storage Co.
v. The Barque Thonas, 29 Leg. Int.
116. decided in the Eastern District
il
of Pennsylvania, said, "T e libellants
are wharfingers at Philadelphia, and
presented their libel in rem to the District Court to enforce the payment of
wharfage as a maritime lien, upon the
respondent's vessel. There is no authoritative adjudication that a claim
of this sort stands upon such a footing.
Certainly it has not been so decided by
the Supreme Court. The weight of judicial opinion is the other way. It has
generally been treated only as a. comanon-law lien, to be enforced by the detention of the vessel by the wharfinger,
or to be recognised and paid as such
out of the proceeds of the sale of the
vessel, which had been brought under
the control of the court, otherwise than
by an original libel filed upon the dockage demand. This is the import of the
opinion of Judge PETERS, in The New
Jersey, I Pet. Adm. 223, and of Mr.
-Justice JOHNSON, in The St. Jago de
Cuba, 9 Wheat. 418, and I do not
-regard the opinion of Judge STORT,
in Ex parte Lewis, 2 Gall. 483, as de-termining a different rule. Until the
Supreme Court shall decide otherwise,
I see no reason for expanding the admiralty cognizance of a demand which
rests securely upon a basis of commonlaw right and for the enforcement
of which, by the wharfinger himself, the
common law supplies an effectual remedy. The disallowance of the libel by
the District Court is therefore affirmed."
'The decree in the United States District Court was entered by Judge CAD"WALADER, than whom no man would
be less likely to go wrong on a point
-of maritime law or usage.
The decision in the Kate Tremaine,

supra, was followed in The Alexander
M1cNeill, 20 Int. Rev. Record 175, decided in the United States District Court
at Savannah, Ga. - They were the only
cases which we know deciding positively
that wharfage is a maritime contract
and entitled to a maritime lien. and with
the opposite decision : Russ iI v. TIe
Asa R. Sift, supra; The G;tm, I
Brown's Adm. 37, and The Storage Co.
v. Barque Thomas, supra, were the only
ones in which proceedings in rent were
instituted for wharfage. So far as Judge
BENEDICT'S views depend upon previous American decisions, they are" illsupported and they do not appear to be
in harmony with the case of The General Smith, or with Rule 12 in Admiralty as amended, both of which, rejecting the principle of the civil and maritime law, followed the lead of the English courts in distinguishing, as regards
the right of lien, between foreign and
domestic ships.
With the law in this condition, the
Supreme Court has by the principal case
settled the question in accordance with
Judge BENEDICT'S views. It is true
that in this case, the barge was foreigu,
whereas the Kate Treunaine was domestic, but the opinion states the law
broadly and flatly without qualifications
as he did. If there is any danger to be
feared from the language used, it is
that it may confirm a yery general disposition to suppose that every contract
with a master is a maritime contract
and that every maritime contract will
support proceedings in ren. Perhaps
it is not profitable to speculate whether
the decision is a correct deduction from
the cases cited, because it has effectually
laid all doubts as to whether wharfage
is entitled to a maritime lien.
H. G. W.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
STEIN v. ItAUCK.
An easement in light and air, to be supplied to the ancient windows of one person from the premises of another, cannot be acquired in Indiana by mere use or
prescription.
By the act of this state "touching easements" (1 R. S. 1876, p. 436), the
legislature intended neither to recognise nor adopt the English rule in relation to
easements in light and air, but to prevent the future acquisition of such easements,
except in conformity with the provisions of such statute.

FROM1 the Dearborn Circuit Court. This was an action, brought
by the appellee, to establish, by use, an easement in light, to be
supplied to his ancient windows from the premises of the appellant.
The complaint alleged such use, uinterruptedly, during twenty
years, acquiesced in by the vendor of the appellant, and by the
appellant after his purchase; and that after such use and acquiescence the appellant erected upon his own premises a frame structure, which effectively and permanently obstructed the light from
the windows of the appellee. The sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint to maintain the action was questioned by a
demurrer, which was overruled.
N. S. Givan and TV. H. 2atthews, for appellant.
J. Schwartz, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BIDDLE, J.-Exceptions were taken to the rejection of certain
evidence; also, to the giving of certain instructions to the jury,
and to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, upon
all of which questions are presented for our decision; but the fundamental question in the case, which must be answered before the
rights of the parties can be ultimately settled, continually recurs
to us, namely, Can an easement in light and air, to be supplied to
the ancient windows of one from the premises of another, be
acquired by use or prescription in the state of Indiana? We
therefore proceed at once to the examination of this question.
We read much in our books about the common-law right in
England of an easement, acquired by use or prescription, in light
or air coming to ancient windows from the premises of another;
but when the history of the right is carefully studied, it will be
found that it was sometimes disputed. It was denied in the case
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of Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. Eliz. 118, and, under the reign of Charles
II., in the case of Palmer v. _leteler, 1 Lev. 122. It -as modifled by the custom of London, and, indeed, was never indisputably
settled until it was established by the statute of 3 Will. 4, c. 71,
see. 3. •But, assuming that such an easement was a commonlaw right in England, before the statute of William IV., the question whether it is a common-law right in the state of Indiana has
never before been directly presented to this court. In the case
of Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316, the question was incidentally
noticed; but that case turned upon the question whether a certain
deed conveyed such an easement by implication, not whether it
could be acquired by use or prescription. And it has been held,
that the common law, as a system, is adopted in this state, except
such parts of it as are inconsistent with our institutions or not
suited to the condition of the country. In the case of Robeson v.
Pittenger,1 Green Ch. 57, it is held, that when ancient lights
have existed for upwards of twenty years, undisturbed, the owner
of an adjoining lot has no right to obstruct them; but this case
was decided mainly on the authority of Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157, which has long ceased to be the law of Massachusetts; for in
the case of Bandall v. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 114, decided more
than sixty years later, it is expressly held, thit "it is the establisbed law, in this Commonwealth, that an easement of light and
air cannot be acquired by prescription," in support of which many
cases are cited. In the case of -Durelv. Boisblanc, 1 La. Ann.
407, where the easement of light to a window was coupled with
the right of way through a passage, it was held that they could not
be obstructed; but the decision was expressly placed upon the
ground that these servitudes were visible and palpable, and, on
examination of the property, the purchaser must have seen them,
the court remarking that "could we believe that he was ignorant
of them, a very different case would have been presented." In
the case of Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, it is held that "twenty
years' uninterrupted and unquestioned enjoyment of lights constitutes them ancient -lights, in the enjoyment of which the owner
will be protected." But CATON, J., in a separate opinion, evidently doubts the wisdom of the rule, and TREAT, C.J.; dissented.
These three cases are all the decisions we can find, and these three
states-New Jersey, Louisiana and Illinois-the only states which
have adopted the English rule concerning easements in light and
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air, acquired by use or prescription, ana the case in Illinois is the
olyv one filly illa;cord with the English decisions, and is based
upon a full adoption of the English common law by a statute of the
state.
Against these decisions we have many American authorities.
In Xarjirv. Bulivinkle, 5 Rich. 311, it is held that, "In the case
of a window, which gives no cause of action to the owner of the
space over which it looks, lie is not bound to obstruct within twenty
years to prevent the acquisition of a right; and 'ithout some
other circumstance, from which his assent to the casement as a
right may be inferred, his grant cannot be presumed from the
mere unobstructed enjoyment." In Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend.
309, that eminent jurist, BRoNSoN, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, says: "There is, I think, no principle upon which
the modern English doctrine on the subjeft of lights can be supported. It is an anomaly in the law. It may do well enough in
England ; and I see that it has recently been sanctioned with some
qualification by an act of Parliament: Stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c.71,
sec. 3. But it cannot be applied in the growing cities and villages
of this country, without working the most mischievous consequences.
* * * Nor ao I find that it has been adopted in any of the states."
This doctrine is filly approved in (herrj v. Stein, 11 Md. 1.
In Iowa, the English doctrine is held inapplicable: Morrison v.
A4farquardt, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 336, s. c. 24 Iowa 85. In
Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1, the English common law of ancient
lights was disapproved. Ohio has decided that "An easement
in light and air, to be supplied to one's windows from the preinises of another, cannot be acquired * * * by use or prescription :" 3Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135. See also Banks v.
The American Tract Society, 4 Sandf. Ch. 488. We have
already cited Randall v. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 114, which is
supported by the following cases : Fifty
1 Associates v. Tudor, 6
Gray 255; Rogers v. Sain, 10 Id. 376; Ca7rigv. Dee, 14 Id.
583. Massachusetts has long since abrogated the English doctrine
by statute. Mr. Washburn says: "The tendency of late years,
in this country, has been against the doctrine of gaining a prescriptive right to the enjoyment of light and air, as an easement
appurtenant to an estate, on the ground that it is incompatible with
the condition of a country which is undergoing such radical and
rapid changes in the progress of its growth :" 2 Washb. Real
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Prop. 346 ; and- he cites the states of New York, Massachusetts,
South Corolina, Maine, Maryland, Alabama, Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, as having discarded the English doctrine; to which
list of states he might have added Ohio, Iowa and West Virginia,
as we have seen by the authorities cited, supra. In several of
the states, the question seems to be yet undecided.
It may not be unprofitable to reason a moment upon the propriety of following the current of American authorities upon this
question, to W'hich a few excEptional cases seem as but eddies. In
the first place, an easement in light or air is unlike any other easement known to the law. It is neither an appurtenance nor a
hereditiment. No definition of property known to the law includes
it specifically. No exclusive right can be had in light or air;
legislation cannot create such a right, because man has no exclusive
dominion over them. " They are for all in common, "and upon
whom doth not his light arise ?" Job 25: 3. And "The wind
bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but
canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth :" St. John
3: 8. To give a right of property in light or air, which can control the right to the use of land, is to make the incident greater
than the principal, -and allow the shadow to control tbb substance.
Second, the owner of open space may not know, and cannot
know of right, the internal arrangement of his neighbor's house;
and may "stand by" while the invading claim, which is finally to
embarrass, if not to destroy, the usefulness of his land, is gradually
accruing against him, until it becomes a vested right, which he cannot dispute.
Third, if he knows that the right is accruing against him, he
has no right of action against the person who enjoys his light or
air, to prevent it, because he has not, and cannot have, any
exclusive property in the light or air which occupies his space; he
has nothing, therefore, to do, except to stand by and lose his rights,
or erect his obstruction within a given time, simply for the purpose
of protecting what was already his own. Besides,Fourth, the injury of such an easement to the land, which can
be used only in the one place where it is, is so great, compared
with the value of the easement in light or air, which can be had
and used everywhere, that no such easement ought to be acquired
by use or prescription, agaihst one who may not know that it is
accruing, or knowing it, can defend against it only by suffering
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expense and inconvenience. The boundaries of the land are generally sufficient for the supply of its own light and air; and we do
not see why the owner should be allowed to go beyond them to
supply himself with these blessings, against the rights of another;
or to throw that which was granted to him as a favor, into an
injury to the grantor.
Upon these authorities, and for these reasons, we are prepared
to hold, as the law of this state, that no one can acquire an easez
ment in light or air, to be supplied from the premises of another,
by mere use or prescription. We cannot see that this rule will
work injury to any one; and we think it will place these impalpable and invisible claims upon a safe footing, consistent with the
rights of all concerned. * It is very easy to reserve such an easement to the vendor, or grant it to the vendee, in the deed which
conveys the land, or to create it by any valid contract; then each
one knows what he sells, and what he buys, and all persons are
protected in their rights. Embarrassments have accumulated, and
injuries have been suffered to property, growing out of the
unsettled views upon this question. It should be put to rest. No
one should stand in danger of unwittingly suffering burdens to be
laid upon his property, nor be constantly compelled to guard
against such an insidious invasion of his rights.
But the appellee insists that the state of Indiana has recognised,
if not adopted, the English rule with regard to easements in light
and air, acquired by use or presciption ; that the allegations of fact
in his complaint bring his case within the rule; that the evidence
proves the facts to be true; and, therefore, that the judgment
should be affirmed. The statute to which he refers is as follows:
"Sec. 1. That the right of way, air, light or other easement,
from, in, upon, or over, the land of another, shall not be acquired
by adverse use, unless such use shall have been continued uninterruptedly for twenty years :" 1 R. S. 1876, p. 486.
Sections second, third and fourth, provide means by which the
owner of the land may prevent the acquisition of such an easement
against him.
We do not concur with the views of the appellee, in reference
to the construction of this statute; and instead of giving our own
reasons for our conclusion, we have found a decision upon a statute
similar to the one cited, indeed almost literally the same, which is
so directly in point that we have adopted its language as our own.
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"It is provided by statute c. 147, see. 14, that 'no person shall
acquire any right or privilege of way, air, or light, or any other
easement, from, in, upon, or over the land of another by the adver:e
use or enjoyment thereof, unless such use shall have been continued
uninterrupted for twenty years.' The following sections prescribe
the mode, by which the acquisition of such rights may be prevented.
It is obvious, that these enactments were not designed to create
or give suclh rights, or to determine when or upon what terms they
had already been acquired. These matters were left to be decided
by the law as it previously existed. The design was to prevent
their future acquisition without conformity to certain prescribed
conditions. It does not even appear to have been intended to
declare, that they would in future be acquired by virtue of the
statute merely, but rather to prevent their acquisition without conformity to its provisions, leaving the decision to the previously
existing law, whether any would be acquired :" Pierre v. Fernald,
26 Me. 436.
Doubtless our legislature, if it had intended to create such a
right as is claimed bythe complaint before us, or to declare that
such a right already existed at common law, would have expressed
itself in direct language to that effect; but, not having done so,
we can give the statute no wider interpretation than its language
warrants ; and, as the right to the easement claimed did not exist
in the state of Indiana by the common law, and has not been
created by statute, it cannot be upheld. As to the principle of
construing a statute which recognises a right, but does not expressly
create it, see Deutschman v. Tie Town of ChYarlestown, 40 Ind.
449.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded,
with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint, and for
further proceedings.
Notwithstanding a few early Amer-

can opinions to the contrary, it is now
quite well settled in this country that no
right to light and air is acquired laterally over the land of an adjoining proprietor, by mere use or prescription for
any length of time. The short ground of
the decisions being, 1st, that the making of a window in one's own building,
on his own land, though looking out
over the land of his neighbor, is no en-

croachment on his neighbor's rights, and

cannot therefore be regarded as adcerse
to him ; it lacks therefore one of the
chief elements of a prescriptive right ;
2d, that the English doctrine is not applicable to the state of things in this
country, and would, if applied, work
mischievous consequences in our cities
and villages.
To Judge GOULD of Connecticut is
apparently due the credit of having first
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purpose of quieting possession, the jury
mav he instructed to make such an one
as til nature of the case requires : Ellridye v. Knott, Cowvp. 214.
" Most of the cases on the subject we
tile rould that ii aeh t'a'c tire window,
claiming the right, overhung or projected have been considering relate to wayis,
over the dljouinig estate, so that it con- commons, nrark Is, watercourses, and the
stituted in and ot itself an encroach- like, where the user or enjoyment, if
not rightful, has been an immediate and
nment or enculirance upon the adjoininm.,property, and tit by twenty years' continuing injury to the person against
existenc eacquired the right to continue. whom tile presumption is made. His
But this fact, if so, night give the right propeity has either been invaded, or his
beneficial interest in it has been rendered
to continue tIe window or overhanging
structure in its place, but would not less valuable. The injury has been of
therefore necessarily establish the right such a character that he might have imto look out over tihe neighboring land. mediate redress by action. But in the
The right of the window to be might be case of windows overlooking the land
thus acquired, but not for persons to of another, the injury, if any, is merely
ideal or imaginary. The light and air
enjoy the prospect out of it.
In 1838 this question, having been which they admit are not tle subjects
indirectly admitted in .1fhau v. Brown, of property beyond the moment of ac13 Wendell 263, directly .arose in the tual occupancy ; and for overlooking
Supreme Court of New York, in Par- one's privacy no action can be mainker v. Foote, 19 Wendell 308 ; an ac- tained. The party has no remedy but
to build oil the adjoining land oppotion on tie case for obstructing tie
light to the plaintiff's house, which 'he site the offensive window : Chandler v.
had erected twenty-four years before Thompson, 3 Camp. 80; Cross v. Lewis,
upon a lot of land he had bought of the 2 B. & C. 686, per BAYLEY, J. Upon
defendant himself, who had after that what principle the courts in England
lapse of time erected a building on his' have applied the same rule of presumpremaining lot, and thus obstructed the tion to two classes of'cases so essentially
light to tie plaintiff's window. The different in character, I have been unaplaintiff's claim was not admitted, and ble to discover. If one commit a daily
as this may be called tire leading case in trespass on the land of another, undera
America, on this side of the question, claim of right to pass over, or feed his
we give the following extract from the cattle upon it, or divert the water from
opinion of BROxSON, J. In answer to his mill, or throw it back upon his land
tile argument derived from other in- or machinery, in these and the like
stances of easements acquired by use or cases, long-continued acquiescence affords strong presumptive evidence of
prescription, he says :right. But in the case of lights, there
" As neither light, air nor prospect
can be the subject of a grant, tre proper is no adverse user, nor indeed any use
presumption, if any, to be made in this whatever of another's property, and no
case is, that there was some covenant or foundation is laid for indulging any presumption against the rightful owner.
agreement not to obstruct tie lights
" Although I am not prepared to
Cross v. Leewis. 2 B. & C. 628, per BAYadopt the suggestion of GOULD, J., in
LETY,J. ; M41oore v. Rawson, 3 Id. 332,
per LITTLEDALE, J.
But this is a mat- Ingraham v. Iutchinson, 2 Conn. 597,
ter of little moment. Where it is pro- that the lights which are protected may
per to indulge any presumption for the be such as project over the land of the
VoL. XXVI.-56
doubted, if not delied, that the Englislh
rule ought to be :dopted in thris country,
and ot suggesting that posihly the early
IEnglili v-ase., might he accounted for on
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adjoining proprietor; yet it is not impossible that there are some considerations connected with the subject which
do not distinctly appear in the reported
cases. See Knight v. Halsey, 2 Bos. & P.
206, per RooKF, J. ; 1 Phil. Ev. 125"
"The learned judges who have laid
down this doctrine have not told us upon
what principle or analogy in the law it
can be maintained. They tell us that
a man may build at the extremity of his
own land, and that he may lawfully have
windows looking out upon the lands of
his neighbor: 2 B. & C. 686 ; 3 Id. 332.
The reason why he may lawfully have
such windows must be because he does
his neighbor no wrong; and indeed so
it is adjudged, as we have already seen ;
and yet, somehow or other, by the exercise of a lawful right in his own land
for twenty years, he acquires a beneficial interest in the land of his neighbor.
The original proprietor is still seised of
his fee, with the privilege of paying
taxe§ and assessments, but the right to
build on the land, without-which city
and village lots are of little or no value,
has been destroyed by a lawful window.
fHow much land can thus be rendered
useless to the owner remains to be settled: 2B. &C. 686; 2 Car. &P. 465;
5 Id. 438. Now what is the acquiescence which concludes the owner? No
one has trespassed upon his land, or
done him. a legal injury of any kind.
He has submitted to nothing but the exercise of a lawful right on the part of
his neighbor. How then has he forfeited the beneficial interest in his property? He has neglected to incur the
expense of building a wall twenty or
flfty feet high, as the case may be-not
for his own benefit, but for the sole
purpose of annoying his neighbor. That
was his only remedy. A wanton act
of this kind, although done on one's
own land, is calculated to render a man
odious. Indeed, an attempt has been
made to sustain an action for erecting
such a wall : Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend.
261. There is, I think, no principle

upon which the modern English doctrine
on the subject of lights can be supported. It is an anomaly in the law. It
may do well enough in England; and I
see that it has recently been sanctioned
with some qualification by an Act of
Parliament: Stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71,
s. 3. But it cannot be applied in the
growing cities and villages of this country without working the most mischievous consequences. It has never, I
think, been deemed a part of our law:
3 Kent's Com. 446, note [a].
"Nor do I find that it has been
adopted in any of the states. The case
[ass. 157, proof Story v. Odin, 12 M
ceeds on an entirely different principle.
It cannot be necessary to cite cases to
prove that those portions of the common
law of England which are hostile to the
spirit of our institutions, or which are
not adapted to the existing state of
things in this country, form no part of
our law. And besides, it would be difficult to prove that the rule in question
was known to the common law previous
to the 19th of April 1775 : Const. N.
Y., art. 7, 13.' There were two 'Nisi
Prius decisions at an earlier day (Lewis
v. Price, in 1761, and Dongal v. Wiison, in 1763), but the doctrine was not
sanctioned in Westminster Hall until
1786, when the case of Darwin v. Upton was decided by the K. B. : 2 Saund.
175, note [2]. This was clearly a departure from the old law : Bury v. Pope,
Cro. Eliz. 118."
This decision has often been approved
in New'York, and may be considered
the settled law of that state. See Myers v. Gemmd, 10 Barb. 537 (1851)
Doyle v. Lloyd, 54 N. Y. 439 (1875).
In 1847, the Supreme Court of Maine,
in Pierre v. Fernall, 26 Me. 436, in well
expressed language thus stated the objectiors to the English rule :"Nothing in the law can be more certain than one's right to occupy and use
his own land as he pleases, if he does
not thereby injure others. He may
build upon it, or occupy it as a garden,
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grass-plat or passage way, without any
loss or diminution of his rights. No
other person can acquire any right or
interest in it, merely on account of the
manner in which it has been occupied.
When one builds upon his own land
immediately adjoining the land of
another person and puts out windows
overlooking that neighbor's land, he
does no more than exercise a legal right.
This is admitted : Cross v. Lewis, 2 B.
& C. 686. By the exercise of a. legal
right he can make no encroachment
upon the rights of his neighbor, and cannot thereby impose any servitude or acquire any easement by the exercise of
such a right for any length of time.
Ile does no injury to his neighbor by
the enjoyment of the flow of light and
air, and does not, therefore, claim or
exercise any right adversely to the
rights of his neighbor. Nor is there
itnything of similitude between the exercise of such a right and the exercise of
rights claimed adversely. It is admitted
in the case supposed that no adjoining
landowner can obtain redress by any
legal process. In other words, that his
rights have not been encroached upon ;
and that he has no cause of complaint.
And yet, while thus situated for more
than twenty years, he loses his right to
the free use of his land, because he did
not prevent his neighbor from enjoying
that which occasioned him no injury
and afforded him no just cause of complaint. The result of the. doctrine is,
that the owner of land not covered by
buildings, but used for any other purpose, may be deprived of the right to
build upon it by the lawful acts of the
owner of the adjoining land performed
upon his own land and continued for
twenty years.
"It may be surely affirmed that the
common law contained no such principle. The doctrine as stated in the more
recent decisions appears to have arisen
out of the misapplication in England of
the principle, by which rights and easements arc acquired by the adverse claim

and enjoyment of them for twenty years,
to a case in which no adverse or injurious claim was .either made or enjoyed."
The courts of Pennsylvania also deny
the application of the English doctrine
to our situation Io jYv. Sterreit, 2
Watts 381 (1833) ; Wheatley v. Bough,
25 l'enna. St. 532 (1855); more emphatically repeated in tHaverstickv. Sipe,
33 Id. 568 (1859).
In South Carolina, it was long
thought. that the English rule was sanctioned by the language used in McCready v. Thomson, Dudley 131 (1838),
but upon full consideration of the arguments and authorities the opposite view
was subsequently taken and fully
adopted by the Court of Appeals,
although the use had continued over
fifty years: Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5
Rich. 311 (1852).
Massachusetts has fully adopted the
same doctrine. It was first suggested by
counsel in that state in Atkins v. Chilson,
7 Mete. 402 (1844), but it became unnecessary to decide it, and again in
Fifty Associates v. Tudor, 6 Gray 259
(1856), but subsequently it was fully
approved and followed in Rogers v.
Sa'in, 10 Gray 376 (1858) ; in Carrig
v. Dee, 14 Id. 583 (1860) ; and in many
other cases since : Richardson v. Pond,
15 Gray 387 (1860) ; Paine v. Boston,
4 Allen 169 (1862) ; Randall v. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 119 (1872), quite
overruling any earlier dicta to the contrary. And it was held immaterial that
the sill of the overlooking window projected over the boundary line so as to
overhang the neighbor's land, or that
the window itself would swing outward
over the same.
In Maryland, algo, notwithstanding
the dictum to the contrary in Wright v.
Freeman, 5 H. & J. 477, the English
rule is now entirely repudiated : Smith
v. White, and Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md.
23 (1858).
It is true, the Maryland courts still
hold that such a right may be acquired
by an implied grant arising from a deed
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of one lot by the proprietor of both :
Jones v. Jenkins, 7 Am . Law Reg. N.
S. 24, s. c. 34 Md. 1 (1871), but even
this is against the current of American
decisions : Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass.
216 (1874).
Vermont, also, in 1860, fully endorsed
and directly applied the American rule
above laid down: Hiubbard v. Town, 33
Vt. 295, the court saying: " We think
the English courts, in applying the doctrine of the presumption of grants from
long use and acquiescence to this class
of cases, clearly departed from the ancient conimon-law rule as laid down in
Bury v. Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118, and the
error, as it seems to us, consists in placing cases like the present upon the same
footing and making them subject to the
same rules that govern another class of
cases, to which they really have no
analogy. In Lewis v. Price, WILmOT,
J., said "that when a house had been
built forty years and has had lights at
the end of it, if the owner of the adjoining ground builds against them so as to
obstruct them, an action lies ; and this
is founded on the same reason as where
these have been immemorial, for this is
long enough to induce a presumption
that there was originally some agreement between the parties, and that
twenty years was sufficient to give a
man a title in ejectment on which he
may recover the house itself, and he
saw no reason why it should not be sufficient to entitle him to an easement beAs we have
longing to the house.'
already seen, no presumption of an
agreement arises, as none was necessary
to justify the act. The man who occupies his own house for twenty years has
no better title to it at the end of that
time than he had in the outset. Does
he acquire any greater right to the light
by .the occupation than to the house I
Clearly not ; having usurped no right
he can acquire none by lapse of time.
The error in the reasoning is, in saying
that because the man who takes possession of his neighbor's house and holds

it adversely for twenty years (his neighbor acquiescing therein), acquires a
title to it, therefore the man who opens
windows in his own house, that in no
way interfere with the rights of his
neighbor, and of which such neighbor
has no legal right to complain, and
keeps them open for twenty years, thereby acquires a right to insist that no act
shall he done by his neighbor on his own
land that in any respect interferes with
or obstructs the light to those windows.
In the one case there is an infringement
of the rights of another for which the
law gives a remedy by action ; in -the
other there is not. This constitutes a
radical difference between the two cases,
and that, too, in respect to the very
point upon which the whole doctrine of
presumption in cases like those under
consideration depends."
The same year the Supreme Court of
Ohio approved this doctrine in lHicatt
v. M1forris, 10 Ohio St. 530 (1860), and
repeated the same in Afullen v. Stricker,
19 Ohio St. 142 (1869). Texas fol-,
lowed the same way in Klein v. Gehrung,
25 Tex. 238 (1860) ;and the next year
Alabama also fully endorsed the same
rule in Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500
(1861) ; and West Virginia is also on
the same side: Powell v. Sints, 5 West
Va. 1 (1871) ; and now Indiana, in our
principal case, has added the weight of
a well-considered judgment in support
of the same view.
Mlforrison .v. i[larquardt,24 Iowa 35
(1867), sorietimes cited on the same
side, seems to have been decided rather
against the doctrine of an implied grant
of a right to light and air from a conveyance of the estate to which it is
claimed as appurtenant ; a very different question, but one, however, which
the main current of authorities in
America decide the same way as when
a right is claimed merely by long use.
In opposition to this long array of
express adjudication, what support has
the English rule in our courts ? The
doctrine of a prescriptive right from
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long uze merely does seem to have
been alproved iii New Jersey in 1,b,.
V l'ittayp r, I Green Ch. 57 (1838),
but there was an additional important
factin that cawe. that the two adjoining
lovhad been both owned by ticesame
party, and after the plaintiff's building
aid been erected on one, he had sold the
defendiant's lot to other parties, from
which an implied grant, or reservation
rather, has been sometimes deduced
of a right to continue the lights as
before. Whether there is or is not a
sufficient foundation for such a claim,
in the absence of express words to
that effect, may well be doubted, but
the claim rests on a very different
basis from that of a mere presumptive
adverse user. The same observation
applies still more strongly to the case
of Dusel v. Boisbanc, 1 La. Ann. 407
(1846).
In ifanier v. M4ers, 4 B. Moor. 520
(1844), Judge MARSHALL, of Kentucky, did quote approvingly, by way
of illustration in a certain case, the English rule, but we do not find any express
decision in that state upon thequestion ;
and Judge STOnY, in United States v.
.Appl(on, I Sumn. 402, apparently approves the doctrine.
In Gerber v. Grabe!, 16 Ill.217
(1854), the marginal notes would indicate that the English rule was approved,
and the case is often so cited, but a careful examination of the case shows that
this was not necessarily the point of the
decision. The action was for wrongfully
obstructing the plaintiff's light, but the
declaration did not allege on what ground
the plaintiff claimed the right, whether
by presumption, express grant, or implied grant, and judgment below having
been arrested, on a verdict for the
plaintiff, this decision was reversed
and judgment on the verdict, because,
said the court, " the plaintiff might
have proved a prescription under
our common law, as we have laid it
diwn, or lie might have proved an express grant ; or lie might have proved

circumstances from which a grant or
estoppel would be presumed without
regard to length of use. We must presume tie proofs warranted the verdict,
and there is nothing in the verdict contrary to law." But Judge ScATES had
already said, after stating the English
rule, " But such is not the rule of the'
common law of Illinois, as I shall prow
ceed to show ;" and he continues, " hile
we highly respect the learned decisions
of English courts adopting an analogous
rule to their statute of limitations, we
must bow to the authority of these older
rulings (which he had before cited as
not supporting the doctrine of prescription), with liberty to say that a twenty
years' prescription for the easement of
light and air is not applicable to the
circumstances of this state, unsettled and
unimproved as it is;" and he cites
with approbation Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 309, and other cases on the same
side. We do not, therefore, understand Illinois to be in favor 6F the English rule. Precisely the same view was
taken in Ward v. Neal, 35 Ala. 602
(1860), viz., that a general avermint of
the right to light might be good as a
matter ofpleading, upon demurrer, since
under that allegation the right might
be proved to have arisen from express
grant, as well as by prescription. But
when the case came again before the
court upon the facts, setting up an adverse user merely, the English rule was
expressly denied and the American
adopted: 37 Ala. 500 (1861). And
nothing in Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63
(1846), sanctions a different opinion,
though it is sometimes cited as doing so.
In view of the course of our decisions on this question, we think it may
be reasonably concluded that, notwithstanding sone early opinions to the contrary, it cannot now' be safely asserted
that the doctrine of a right to light and
air by a mere prescriptive use prevails at
present in a single Anerican state.
EDMUND H. B NNETT.
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Supreme Court of Errors of tlte State of (oinecticut.
STATE v. ANTON BANTLEY.
If one person intentionally inflicts upon another a wound, calculated to destroy
life, and death ensues therefrom within a year and a day, the offence is murder or
manslaughter, as the case may be; and he is none the .less responsible for the
result, although it may appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had
taken proper care of himself, or that unskilful or improper treatment aggravated
the wound and contributed to his death.
A charge of the court, claimed to be erroneous, is to he considered, not in the
abstract, but with reference to the actual facts of the case.

INFORMATION for manslaughter, brought to the Superior Court

in Hlartford county, and tried to the jury, on the plea of not guilty.
Verdict, guilty, and motion for a new trial for error in the charge
of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.
G. G. Sill and T. B. Steele, in support of the motion.
W. Hamersley, State's Attorney, contrd.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARDEE, J.-On the night .of June 11th 1876, the accused
inflicted a severe gun-shot wound upon the arm of one March,
between the elbow and shoulder; -March diett eleven days thereafter of lockjaw. The prosecution claimed that death resulted
from the wound; the accused claimed that it resulted from the
treatment of the case by the attending physicians. The wound
was dressed in the first instance by one surgeon; afterwards, to the
time of death, by another. These differed radically as to the manner in which the case should have been treated. The counsel for
the accused claimed, and asked the court to charge the jury, that
if they should find that the death of March .was the result or consequence of wilful mismanagement or gross carelessness on the part
of the attending surgeons, they could not find the accused guilty
of manslaughter, as charged in the information. The court
charged the jury that unless they should find that March died
from a wound inflicted by the accused, as charged in the information, they could not convict'him of manslaughter; but that if they
should find that the accused wilfully and without justifiable cause
inflicted on March a dangerous wound, from which death would be
likely to ensue, and if they should find also that his death did in
fact ensue from, and was caused by, the wound, and nQt from any
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other cause, carelessness and mismanagement of whatever character,
on the part of the attending surgeons, would be immaterial, and
the treatment of the case by them, whatever it may have been, could
not avail the accused as a defence.
As to the law applicable to this case, Roscoe says: "The law on
this point is laid down at some length by Lord HALE. If, he says,
a man give another a stroke, which, it may be, is not in itself so
mortal but that with good care he might be cured, yet if he dies
within the year and a day, it is a homicide or murder as the case is,
and so it has been always ruled. But if the wound be not mortal,
but with ill application by the party or those about him of unwholesome salves or medicines the party dies, if it clearly appears that
the medicine and not the wound was the cause of the death, it seems
it is not homicide; but then it must clearly and certainly appear to
be so. But if a man receive a wound which is not in itself mortal,
but for want of helpful applications or from neglect it turis to a
gangrene or a fever, and the gangrene or fever be the immediate
cause of the death, yet this is murder or manslaughter in him that
gave the stroke or wound; for that wound, though it was not the
immediate cause of the death, yet.if it were the mediate cause, and
the fever or gangrene the immediate cause, the wound was the
cause of the gangrene or fever, and so consequently cauea causans :" Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, 7th ed., 717; 1 Hale P. C.
428. In Rex v. Rew8, J. Kelynge 26, it was held that neglect
or disorder in the person who receives the wound will not excuse
the person who gave it; that if one gives wounds to another who
neglects the care of them and is disorderly and does not keep that
rule which a wounded person should do, if he die, it is murder or
manslaughter, according to the circumstances of the case, because
if the wounds had not been given the man had not died. In Begina v. Holland, 2 Mood. & Rob. 851, the deceased had been
severely cut with an iron instrument across one of his fingers, and
had refused to have it amp itated; and at the end of a fortnight
lockjaw came on and the finger was then amputated, but too late,
and the lockjaw ultimately caused death. The surgeon expressed
the opinion that early amputation would probably have saved his
life. MAULE, J., held that a party inflicting a wound which ultimately becomes the cause of death is guilty of murder, though life
might have been preserved if the deceased had not refused to submit to a surgical operation. In Commonwealth v. Pike, 3 Cush.
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181, it was held that where a surgical operation is performed in a
proper manner and under circumstances which render it necessary,
in the opinion of competent surgeons, upon one who has received a
wound apparently mortal, and such operation is ineffectual to afford
relief and save the life of the patient, or is itself the immediate
cause of the death, the party inflicting the wound will nevertheless
be responsible for the consequences. Greenleaf says (Greenleaf's
Ev., vol. 3, sect. 139, 5th ed.), "If death' ensues from a wound
given in malice, but which being neglected or mismanaged the party
died, this will not excuse the prisoner who gave it; but he will be
held guilty of the murder unless he can make it clearly and certainly appear that the maltreatment of the wound or the medicines
administered to the patient or his own misconduct and not the
wound itself was the sole cause of his death, for if the wound had
not been given the party had not died."
In Bex v. Johnson, 1 Lewin C. C., the deceased died from a
blow received in a fight with the prisoner; a surgeon expressed an
opinion that a blow on the stomach, in the state in which the deceased was, arising from passion and intoxication, was calculated to
occasion death, but not so if the party had been sober. IiULLOCK,
B., directed an acquittal, observing that when the death was occasioned partly by a blow and partly by a predisposing circumstance
it was impossible to apportion the operation of the several causes
and to say with certainty that the death was immediately occasioned
by any one of them in particular. Of this case, Roscoe remarks
that it may be doubted how far this ruling of the learned judge
was correct :Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 7th ed., 718. In Rex v. llartiv,
5 Car. & P. 130, where the deceased at the time when the blow
was given was in an infirm state of health, PAnRK, J., said to the
jury, " It is said that the deceased was in a. bad state of health,
but that is perfectly immaterial, as, if the prisoner was so unfortunate as to accelerate her death he must answer for it." In Cornmonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136, it was held that one who has
wilfully inflicted upon another a dangerous wound with a deadly
weapon, from which death ensued, is guilty of murder or manslaughter, as the evidence may prove, although through want of due care
or skill the improper treatment of the wound by surgeons may have
contributed to the death.
Upon these authorities we may state the rule as follows: If one
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person inflicts upon another a dangerous wound, one that is calcu-'
lated to endanger and destroy life, and death ensues therefrom
within a year and a day, it is sufficient proof*of the offence either
of manslaughter or murder, as the case may be; and he is none
the less responsible for the result, although it may appear that the
deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or that unskilful or improper treatment aggravated the wound
and contributed to his death.
There is no such defect in the law as that the person who intentionally inflicts a wound calculated to destroy life, and from which
death ensues, can throw responsibility for the act upon either the
carelessness or the ignorance of his victim; or shield himself behind
the doubt which disagreeing doctors may raise as to the treatment
proper for the case. Indeed, counsel for the defendant do not really
deny the force of the rule. Their complaint is rather in the nature
of a verbal criticism of the charge. The judge said to the jury
that if the death of March resulted from the wound and from no
other cause, carelessness and mismanagement of whatever character
on the part of the attending surgeon, would be immaterial. It is
to be presumed in favor of a charge that it refers to matters concerning which witnesses have testified and to points concerning
which counsel have presented argument, and it is not to be presumed
that it includes within its scope all possibilities. From this record
we cannot perceive that any witness suggested even that the attending surgeons caused the death of March by an intentional misapplication or withholding of remedies, or that counsel in argument
intimated any such thing. The motion states that the two doctors
differed radically regarding the treatment proper for the case: the
claim of each as to the other was that he had erred through ignorance, not by criminal intention; and when the judge used the
expression complained of in this case we are to presume that he
referred, and that the jury understood him to refer, to that kind of
mismanagement alone of which witnesses had testified and concerning which counsel had argued in their hearing. With this limitation, the defendant has no occasion for complaint.
A new trial is not advised.
VOL. XXVI.-57
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'A. landlord who has demised property, parting with possession and control
thereof to a tenant in occupation, is not responsible for injuries arising from defiective cdndition of such premises, when that defect arises during iic continuance
of the lease.
Upon leased premises, a water..pipe and gutter,' not defective in thcir original
construction, became stoppedjup,.so that water flowedi upon the door-steps of the
.leased house, forping ice, upon which plaintiff fell and was injured. As between
lessor and lessee, in the absence of contract to the contrary, it is tWe0 duty of the
latter to'repair the 'pipe 4re6ve the ice', and for failure iin this he is liable, and
not, the lmindlord.'
-If the defective condition of leased premises occasions damage, in order to make
the lessor or landlord responsible, it is not sufficient merely to allege ownership in
him, but the special circumstances creating his iability must be averred.

!ERROR to the District Court of ,Defiance county.
On, demurrer
to petition, which set out, that defendant. loon wasthe owner
and defendant Francis Brooks the,,_lessee, and, possessed of
_.certain premises. situate in said county, to wit, &c.;, that
said Brooks was, then using and kept said premises as the post
office of, said. yillage ; that said .defendant
oon,- prior, ,to his
demise, of the said premises t9 said Brooks, had, erected and attaphed to the building situate thereon, a part of wi~ich building
was so, used as a post office, a conductor or 'water-pipejleading from
the roof, thereof to the sidewalk of, said street,, and that the water
brought down and running through said piPe frpom the said roof,

'was discharged u pon,,the sidewlk of said: street, close by the steps
and door leading therefrom into said-,ps o
tand .tlit at and
prjor.to the time of said injuries the, said defendant, had suffered
, qhgutter attached to saidroof to become filled and obstructed and
the water to fall directl.from said roof upon said stes and side'walk'around the same; that said defendants and each of them had
'ca elessly, negligently and wrongfully, on and prior to the 21st day
of December, A. D, 1872, suffered the water which had so fallen
'from said roof upon said steps apd, valk, andvhich had so been
discharged from said conductor around said, steps, to become and
remain frozen unevenly, and in ridges on said steps and walk
around the same, and by reason of the premises, said defendants
had then knowingly suffered said steps and walk to become unsafe
to persons passing thereon ; and that plaintiff, without fault or negligence on his part and while lawfully passing from said post office
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over said steps to and upon said sidewalk, by reason of the premises, unavoidably slipped upon said st e ps and fell upon said sidewalk, whereby the left ankle of him, the said plaintiff, was then
and there broken, &c.
In the Court of Common Pleas this demurrer was overruled and
the cause proceeded to trial, resulting in favor of the plaintiff below,
now plaintiff in error, but the District Court reversed the judgment,
holding that the petition stated no cause of action.
Henry Newbegin, for plaintiff in error.
T. W. Sutphen, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WRIGiHT, J.-The petition and demurrer involve questions relating to the liability of landlord and tenant, lessor and lessee, where
a third person has been injured in consequence of some defect in
condition of the premises. Moon was the owner of certain property in the village of Defiance, which he had leased to Brooks,
who was in possession of and using the same for a post office. A
pipe or gutter attached to the building had become obstructed or
stopped up, and the water, instead of running through it, flowed
over the roof. This water falling upon the steps of the post office
in winter, ice was formed. Coming from the post office plaintiff
slipped upon this ice, fell, and was hurt.
Moon, the landlord, and Brooks, the tenant, were both sued.
Brooks was dismissed from the action, and the question to be decided is, is Moon, the landlord, liable upon the statements made in
the petition ?
The liabilities arising from the relation of landlord and tenant
are these: liability generally accompanies occupation, and when a
landlord leases and parts with the possession, his liabilities are in
certain instances devolved upon the tenant. The principle which
runs through cases, determining the responsibility of the one or the
other, may be thus defined. Whoever had control of the premises
at the time the cause of the injury originated, that person is liable
in damages, which simply means that the party in fault must respond. Hence it is that where, at the time of the lease, the property is in a ruinous or'defective condition, and by reason thereof
the injury happens, then the owner or lessor is liable, generally ;
though there are cases which make this liability dependent upon
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the covenants of the lease. And upon the other hand, when this
defective condition arose after the lease, then the tenant is responsible, with perhaps exceptions upon covenants. And when there
has been a nuisance of continued existence, lessor and lessee may
both be"liable for damages resulting therefrom. The lessee in actual
possession of the premises, if he continues the nuisance after notice
of its existence and notice to abate it, and the lessor if he at first
created it and demised the premises with the nuisance upon them,
and at the time of the damage done is receiving a benefit therefrom
by way of rent or otherwise.
In -po8wellv. Prior, 12 Mod. 635, it is held that if an owner
erect a' nuisance for which damages are recovered, and the nuisance
is continued in the hands of his lessee, an action for the continuance of it may be against either. Here the nuisance or original
trouble was occasioned by the owner, and he is held responsible
even after the lease. The court says that both may be liable, the
landlord for originating and the tenant for continuing. It is said
in the case that the erector of the nuisance cannot discharge himself by assigning over, and more especially when he grants over,
reserving rent, by which he continues the nuisance, having a recompense for it in such rent.
This case illustrates the idea that control is the criterion
of responsibility, for control means that power which occasions
and which can prevent. The nuisance was erected, that is, originated by the owner, who manifestly, therefore, should be responsible for its consequences. But it will be observed that not only
the owner, but the tenant also is held liable, upon the ground that
every continuance of a nuisance is a fresh nuisance: Taylor Land.
& Ten., sec. 175 ; V,edder v. Tredder, 1 Den. 257 ; Little Miami
BRailroad Co. v. Commissionerm of Green County, 30 Ohio St. (not'
yet reported). This fresh nuisance the tenant might abate if he
saw fit, being in control of the premises, and for failure in this he
is responsible.
In Todd v. Plight, 9 Com. . (N. S.) 377 (9 J. Scott N. S.),
there was a demurrer to a declaration. Defendant leased to a tenant a lot, in which stood a stack of old chimneys, in a ruinous and
dangerous condition, at the time of the lease, and defendant knew
it and so maintained them. The chimneys fell on plaintiff's house,
and defendant was held liable on the declaration. ERLE, J., says,
390: "It is alleged that the defendant let the houses when the
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chimneys were kuiown by him to be ruinous and in danger of falling, and that he kept and maintained them in this state, and thus
he was guilty of the wrongful non-repair which led to the damage,
and after the demise time fall appears to have arisen from no fault
of the kvssee, but by the laws of nature." The owner of premises
who leases them when they are in such want of repair or bad condition as to be a nuisance, or when, from the ordinary course of
events, they must become so, and receives rent for their use, is
liable to a third person for injury happoning in consequence of this
defective condition or nuisance. In such case the landlord had the
control of the property at the time the trouble was occasioned, and
he might have removed it. It is the party who does the wrong who
should be made responsible for the consequences it entails.
But if the nuisance arises solely from the act of the tenant, the
landlord cannot be held: Owing v. Jones, 9 Md. 108; Staple v.
Spring, 10 Mass. 79; Waggoner v. Jermaine, 3 Denio 806 ; Fish
v. -Dodge,4 Id. 311; House v. Metealf, 27 Conn. 632; Smith v.
Elliot, 9 Barr 845.
Rich v. Basterfield,4 Com. B. 783, was a case much discussed, and
decided for plaintiff at Nisi Prius, but unanimously reversed in full
court. The owner of a house, standing back from the street, built
a low shop between his house and the street, with a chimney, and
rented out the shop. The tenant used the chimney for a fire, and
when the wind was from the east, or south-east, smoke was blown
into plaintiff's windows, causing him great annoyance. Defendant,
the owner, was sued on the ground that he built the chimney which
made the nuisance, and was answerable for the ordinary use of it.
The court held that the chimney itself was not a nuisance, but it
was the fire made by the tenant; that coke might have been used,
or he might have abstained from having a fire when the wind was
in the wrong direction, and the owner therefore was not liable. He
had no control of the fire.
Upon the other hand, in House v. Mietcalf, 27 Conn. 632, an
owner had leased a mill situated so near the highway that its revolving wheel frightened horses. The owner was held responsible.
although it would seem that not the mill itself, but its operation in
the hands of the tenant, occasioned the difficulty.
Gandy v. Jubber, 5 B. & S. 485, a grate over the sidewalk long
there, had the bars so wide apart that a woman slipped her foot
through and lamed herself. The premises were rented at the time
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from year to year, and the landlord, the heir of the original owner
and builder, was held liable on the ground that the grate was a
nuisance in its original construction. Declaration avers that the
tenant "was no under obligation to alter, repair or keep in repair,"
and that it had been years so that one might fall through. The
jury found that the grate was a nuisance, both from the faultiness
of its construction

and from want of repair.

CROMPT9N, J.,

says, "it must be a nuisance in its very nature and essence
at the time of the letting, and not merely something which is
capable of thereafter being rendered a nuisance by the tenant."
This
BLACKBURN says, "the nuisance must be a normal one."
case was reversed in the Exchequer, 9 B. & S. 15. It is, however, there said that 1"to bring liability home to the owner,
the premises being let the nuisance must be one which was in
its very nature and essence a nuisance at the time of letting, and
not something which was capable of being -thereafter rendered a
nuisance by the tenant, and that it is a sound principle of the law
that the owner of property receiving rent should be liable for a nuisance existing in his premises at the date of the demise." And tlie
judgment of the Queen's Bench is reversed on the ground that,
"it is not averred either directly or by any reasonable inference
that the 'grating was defective at the time of letting." Wharton on
Neg., sect. 817, says: " An owner being out of possession and not
bound to repair, is not liable in this action for injuries in consequence of his neglect to repair. But where the nuisance existed
when the property was leased to the tenant, the landlord may be
held liable; so the tenant is liable for the nuisance thus retained by
him, even though the nuisance was on the premises when leased to
him. And both landlord and tenant under the circumstances are
jointly and severally liable for the continuance of the nuisance,
supposing the nuisance to be on the property when leased, or to be
put there with the landlord's connivance."
The City of Lowell v. Spalding, 4 Cush. 277, was case for damage to plaintiff by falling into a space left open in the sidewalk,
where it was held that the occupant and not the landlord is bound,
as between himself and the public, so far to keep the buildings in
repair, that they will be safe for the public, and such occupant is,
primafacie, liable to third persons for damages arising from any
defect. If there is an express contract that the landlord shall
repair, suit will be sustained against him to avoid circuity of action.
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The occupier is primafaeie liable and the owner is not, merely as
owner without fault on his part: Russell v. 'henton, 3 A. & E.
N. S.449.
There is another large class of cases that would seem to be not
entirely in accordance with the view that has been advanced, though
perhaps the difference is more in appearance than reality. There
are cases where the liability is devolved in accordance with the covenants of the lease and made to accompany the duties it imposes.
If the defect existed prior to the lease, and by its provisions the
tenant assumes the responsibility of keeping the premises in repair,
it has been held that the landlord was not responsible. In the
early case of Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Blk. 350, the head-note is,
"if the owner of a house is bound to repair it, he and not the occupier is liable to an action on the case for an injury sustained by
a stranger, from a want of repairs."
This was an action against the owner of a house in the occupation
of a tenant. It does not seem to have been made a point in the
case, whether the defect arose before or after the demise, a question
important, as we have seen, in cases not involving the element of
covenants in the lease. The case is made wholly to turn upon the
agreement as to repairs between the landlord and the tenant. And
the landlord, having bound himself to the tenant to repair, is made
liable for the injury. Although nothing is said in the case about
who had control of the premises, and though the facts do not show
in whom that control was when the defect occasioning the injury
originated, still it may be perhapd fairly said that by binding himself to repair, the owner retained such control as would enable him
to make those repairs. This view is sustained by the language of the
court in Burdick v. Oheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393: "But in case a landlord undertakes with his tenant to keep the premises in repair,
having thus reserved the control to the extent necessary for making
repairs, his duty to the public in relation to the property is not
affected by the lease, and he remains responsible under the doctrine
of the above maxim (sic utere,. &c.), for defects arising from the
want of repairs during the continuance of the lease."
In the case of Pretty v. Birkmore, Law Rep. 8 0. P. 401, the
tenant had covenanted to repair. The premises were dangerous at
the time of the demise. But it was held that the landlord was not
liable because of the tenant's covenant. This case is disapproved
of in Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28, although it is followed up by
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the case of Gwinnell v. Earner, Law Rep. 10 C. P. 658. See also
Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86; Shipley v. Fifty Associates,
106 Id. 194; 101 Id. 251; Shearman & Redfield on Neg., sects.
501, 502.; Whaler v. Gloucester, 11 Hun 24, s. 99; Nelson v.
Liverpool Brewery Company, Law Rep. 2 C. P. Div. 811.
It is hot necessary, however, nor do we undertake to decide as to
any of the rights or liabilities, which subsist by reason of the covenants of leases. What the terms of the letting in this case are,
we have no means of knowing, nor are we advised whether the landlord or tenant undertook to repair. The remarks made apply only
to such cases as involve no consideration of the agreement by which
the demise was made, other than the mere fact of its existence.
The lessor is not liable to a stranger for an injury arising out of
the property being out of repair, unless under special circumstances,
such as a covenant with the lessee to make the repairs: Bears v.
Ambler, 9 Barr 193.
"If the owner as distinct from the occupier is sued for damages
arising from a falling wall, a special ground of liability must be
averred, other than mere ownership. The public looks to the
occupier, not to the estate: Chauntler v. .Robison, 4 Exch. 163.
"Where property is demised and at the time of the demise is not
a nuisance and becomes so only by the act of the tenant while in
his possession, and injury happen during such possession, the owner
is not liable." "But where the owner leases premises, which are
a nuisance or must in the nature of things become so by their user,
and receives rent, then whether in or out of possession he is liable
for injuries resulting from such nuisance :" Owings v. Jones, 9 Md.
108; Fisc v. Dodge, 4 Denio 811; Hadley v. Taylor, Law Rep. 1
C. P. 53; Fisk v. Framingham Hem. Co., 14 Pick. 491 ; Chatham
v. Hampsin, 4 T. R. 318; Morton v. Wiswell, 26 Barb. 618.
A w.ell-considered case upon this subject is found in Swords v.
Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28. Defendants *ere owners of a pier, which
was
under lease. A laborer engaged in discharging the cargo of a
steamer
was injured by reason of the pier falling, through
rottenness of its timbers. The defect existed at the time the lease was
made. It is held, that ordinarily it is the duty of the occupant to
see that the premises are secure, but where they are leased and at
the time of the demise and delivery of possession to the lessee
they are in a defective and unsafe condition, and in consequence,
thereafter, while in possession of the lessee an injury happens, the
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lessor, who is receiving a benefit by way of rent or otherwise, is
liable. And the owner or lessor was held responsible. In this
case, as in many others that might be cited, we find the same principle and it is thus stated in Pi8er v. Therhill, 21 Mich. 1: "a
party will not be liable for an injury occasioned by a nuisance on
the ground of his possession of the premises where the nuisance is
shown to exist, unless his possession be such as to give him the
legal control of the premises."
This was the case of a person injured by falling through a coal
hole in the sidewalk, and the question was whether the landlord or
tenant was liable. When a landlord has leased premises he parts
with control of them ; with possession that control passes to the
tenant, and if a defect arises, or want of repair, or the premises are
allowed to get into such a condition as that they become dangerous
during the demise, it is the duty of the tenant to take such steps as
will prevent injury.
The liability arising from the control of premises is illustrated
in that large class of cases where contractors build houses. If the
premises are completely given up to the contractor, he will be responsible to one injured during the progress of the work. If on
the other hand the owner retains supervision, and the building goes
on under his direction, as he is in control of the premises his responsibility continues; the contractor or builder then stands to
him in the relation of servant. And there are many nice cases as
to whether the party is an independent contractor or servant merely.
It is, however, not necessary to enter into this discussion ; the principle of control and its accompanying liability is sufficiently illustrated in City of Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38. The city
contracted with B. to grade a street, in doing which he blocked the
water so that it flowed over Stone's ground, doing damage. The
city was held liable on the ground that by the contract she reserved
the right to direct the manner of doing the work. The syllabus
says, that where the employer retains control and direction of the
work, and injury happens, he will be responsible: Clark v. _FrY,
8 Ohio St. 358; Gwathney v. Little Miami Railroad Co., 12
Id. 92. The principle .suggested is recognised in Burdik v.
Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393. In that case the person injured was
in the itore upon the invitation of the tenant, or as a customer, and
was not a stranger, maintaining his rights as one of the public. It
is held, that if one invites another into danger and hurt, the sufferer
VOL. XXVI.-58
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must seek his remedy against the party inviting him. That he
cannot maintain an action against another, is apparent from the
fact, that if he had not accepted the invitation, he would not have
been injured.
In Burdick v. Cheadle, the court in discussing the maxim "sic
utere, &c.," observes, "'The principle ordinarily applies only to
persons in possession and having control of the property either as
owners or tenants."
The rule therefore deducible from the authorities, and which is
applicable to the case in hand, is this-a landlord who is out of
* possession of the premises by virtue of a demise, and who has no
control over them, who would not have the right to enter therein
even to make repairs, without his tenant's consent, is not liable for
accidents occasioned by the fact that the property is temporarily
out of repair. If the defect is inherent in the original construction, and this occasions the injury, then the landlord or lessor is
responsible, but when the defect arises after the lease, then the
tenant is responsible.
Examining the amended petition, therefore, we find this alleged:
Moon was the owner and Brooks the lessee, and possessed of the
premises, using and keeping them as a post office. It is then
averred that the water-pipe or gutter became filled and obstructed,
and the water fell from the roof upon the steps leading from the
post office to the sidewalk. This froze and the plaintiff slipped on the
steps and fell. The cause of the injury is the stopping up of the
pipe. It is not alleged that there was a fault in its original construction, but it would appear to be one of those obstructions that
may occur at any moment. It is not averred that this obstruction
existed before the demise was made, and such an averment is necessary before the landlord can be held. If it occurred after the demise,"it is the duty of the tenant or occupier to see that such obstruction was removed. The petition, therefore, lacks the necessary
averments to show that the landlord is liable, as it does not show a
defect when the premises were in his control before he leased, and
for which alone he is responsible. All facts necessary to raise a legal
liability must be strictly averred: Metcayf v, fetheri&qton, 11
Exch. 257.
And again, it was the ice that occasioned the accident. It is not
averred that it was the duty of the landlord to remove this ice, nor
does it appear that he had such control of the premises as called
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upon him to do it. If this ice was a nuisance to the passing public,,
endangering their lives and limbs, it was a nuisance arising during
the continuance of the lease. It was a thing temporary in its
nature, a defective condition of things, such as the tenant was called
upon to remedy, and not the landlord, as between landlord and
tenant.
Judgment affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Texas.
CHARLES FRAStIER v. THE STATE OF TEXAS.
Marriage is not a contract protected by the constitution of the United States or
any of its amendments. It is a civil status under the control of the states, and
the existence of the relation and the rights, obligations and duties arising out of it
are to be determined exclusively by state laws.
The provision of the Texas code making marriage of a white person to a negro
an indictable offence is not repugnant to or avoided by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the constitution of the United States, or the legislation of Congress
under them.
The fact that by the code the penalty is imposed on the white person only, does
not make it obnoxious to the Civil Rights Bill.

APPEAL from the District Court of Gregg county: The indictment in this case charged that on Miarch 18th 1875, in the county
and state aforesaid, the defendant, being then and there a White
man, did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously,
marry a negro, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.
The indictment was based upon article 2016 of the Criminal
Code (P. D.), *which is as follows: "If any white person shall,
within this state, knowingly marry a negro, or a person of mixed
blood, descended from negro ancestry to the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have been a
white person, or having so married, in or out of the state, shall
continue within this state to cohabit with such negro, or such
descendant of a negro, he or she shall be punished by confinement
in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years."
The defendant was tried at the July Term 1877, of the District
Court of Gregg county, and convicted, and his punishment assessed
at four years' confinement in the penitentiary.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ECTOR, P. J.-The counsel for the defendant insists that the
Act of 1858, under which this prosecution was had, is in conflict
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with the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the constitution
of the United States and the first section of the Civil Rights Bill;
that the statute prohibiting such marriages was passed in the
interest of slavery, before that institution was abolished, and when
the negro was not a citizen of the United States, and that it cannot be enforced, because it prescribes a penalty to be inflicted upon
the white person alone.
The first question, then, presented for the consideration of this
court, is whether the positions assumed, as above stated, by the
defendant's counsel, or any one of them, are correct. We are not
unmindful of the questions involved, and have given them our most
careful and thoughtful consideration. No question mor6 important
in its consequences, or more profoundly interesting to the people
of this country, has ever been before this court.
It is evident that the fifteenth amendment has no application or
bearing whatever upon the question at issue. The fourteenth
amendment contains four separate and distinct propositions:1. It confers the right of citizenship upon all persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and who are subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
2. It declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.
3. It prohibits any state from depriving any citizen of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
4. It provides that no state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
In placing a construction upon a constitution, or any clause or a
part thereof, a court should look to the history of the times, and
examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any
part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the
mischief and the remedy. The court should also look to the nature
and objects of the particular powers, duties and rights in question,
with all the lights and aids of cotemporary history, and to give to
the words of each provision just such operation and force, consistent
with their legitimate meaning, as will fairly secure the end proposed: Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters 524; Priggv. Commonwealth, 16 Id. 539.
In the Slaughter House Cases, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in referring to the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
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amendments of the constitution, say: "An examination of the
history of the causes which led to the adoption of these amendments, and of the amendments themselves, demonstrates that the
main purpose of all the last three amendments was the freedom
of the African race, the security and perpetuation of that freedom,
and their protection from the oppression of the white men who had
formerly held them in slavery. In giving construction to any of
these articles, it is necessary to keep this main purpose in view,
though the letter and spirit of those articles must apply to cases
coming within their purview, whether the party concerned be of
African descent or not.",
We will now proceed briefly to construe the first section of the
fourteenth amendment. The first clause of this amendment reads:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside.
This clause declares and determines who are citizens of the United States and how their citizenship is created. Before its enactment there had been much
diversity of opinion among jurists and statesmen, whether there
was any citizenship independent of that of state citizenship, and,
if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated. To
remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship, and to declare what should
constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a
state, the'first clause of the first section was framed. It clearly
recognises the distinction between citizenship of the United States
and citizenship of a state. A, person must reside within a state to
make him a citizen of it. 'Hemust be born or naturalized in the
United States to be a citizen of the union. The Supreme Court
of thci United States,'in construing this clause, say, " that its main
purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, can admit
of no doubt." The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction," was
intended to exclude' from .its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign states born within the
United States: 16'Wall. 36.
The language of the second clause of the section under consideration is, "No state shall make or enforce 'any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." The first mention of the words "privileges or immunities," is found in the fourth of the articles of the old confederation.
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In the constitution of the United States, which superseded the articles of confederation, we find in section two of the fourth article
the following words: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
states." This clause of the constitution has been construed. The
first and'leading case on this subject is that of .Corfield v. Coryell,
decided by Justice WASHINGTON, in the Circuit Court for the district of Pennsylvania in 1824. "The inquiry," he says, is, "what
are the privileges and immunities of citizens of .the several states ?
We find no hesitancy in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental, which belong of right
to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times
been enjoyed by citizens of the several states which compose this
union, from the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are it would be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by
the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject,
nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may generally
prescribe for the general good of the whole :" 4 Wash. C. C. 880.
This definition of the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the states is adopted in the main by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Ward v. The State of Marland,12
Wall. 430. See also case of .Paulv. Virginia, 8 Id. 180.
This clause, under consideration, did not profess to control the
-power of the state governments over the rights of their own citizens.
Its intent and purpose were to declare to the several states, that
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own
citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their
exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of
the rights of other states within your jurisdiction. It was never
the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration
that no state should make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States,
to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights embraced within the entire dominion of privileges and immunities of
citizens of the states, from the states to the federal government:

Crandallv. Nevada, 6 Wall. 86.
It may be said that the cases cited were decided before the pass-
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age of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. The
Supreme Court of the United States, after the passage of the
fourteenth alnendiueit, have had occasion to construe this clause.
The following extract is taken from the opinion of the court: "Was
it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment by the simple declaration that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the Jri'ileges or n miunities of citizens of the United States, to
transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we
have mentioned from the states to the federal government? And
where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce
that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress
the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively
to the state ?"

"All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be sound. For not only are these rights subject to
the control of Congress 'whenever, in its discretion, any of them
are supposed to be abridged by state legislation, but that body may
also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of
legislative power by tie states in their most ordinary and useful
functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still further, such a construction, followed by the reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these
cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with
authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with
those rights as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
amendment.
"The argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive
which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption
of a particular construction of the instrument. But when, as in
the case before us, the consequences are so serious, so far reaching
and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit
of our institutions, when the effect is to fetter and degrade the state
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the
exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them, of the
most ordinary and fundamental character; when, in fact, it radically
changes the whole theory of the relations of the state and federal
governments to each other and of both of these governments to the
people, the argument has a force that is irresistible in the absence
of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of
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doubt." "We are convinced that no such results were intended
by the Congress which proposed those amendments nor by the legislatures of the states which ratified them :" 16 Wall. 36.
Again, in the case of Minor v. Happersett, the same court held,
"that the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United
States does not add to the 'privileges or immunities' of citizens,
but only furnishes additional protection for the privileges, &c., already existing:" 21 Wall. 162.
The third clause of the section is as follows: "Nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." "Due process of law" is the application of the
law as it exists in the fair and regular course of administrative procedure.
The fourth clause of the fourteenth amendment is: "Nor shall
any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." This clause was added in the abundance of
caution, for it provides, in express terms, what was the fair, logical
and just implication from what had preceded it, and that was, that
persons made citizens by the amendment, should be protected by
the laws in the same manner, and to the same extent, that white
citizens were protected.
In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 .Wall. 36, the Supreme Court
of the United States say: "We doubt very much whether any
action of a state, not directed by way of discrimination against the
negro as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race, and that emergency, that a strong case would
be necessary for its application to any other."
It is urged that the Civil Righits Bill has abrogated the section
of our statute under which the indictment in this cause was found.
The first section of the Civil Rights Bill is in these words: "That
all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indiafis not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States; and that such citizens, of every
race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery
or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right
in every state and territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell; hold and convey real and personal property,
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and to have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white persons, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties,
and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding."
The first section of the act known as the Civil Rights -Bill, confers upon persons of the African race power to make and enforce
contracts. The power, as conferred in the first part of the section,
is without limitation, but, in the latter part of the section, it is
expressly restricted and qualified by the plain declaration that the
rights conferred' shall be enjoyed in the same manner and to the
same extent "as is enjoyed by white persons."
It therefore becomes necessary to inquire whether Congress possesses the power under the federal constitution to pass a law regulating and controlling the institution of marriage in the several
states of the union.
Mr. Justice NELSON, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of The Collector v. Day,
11 Wall. 113, says: "It is a familiar rule of construction of the
constitution of the union that the sovereign powers'vested in the
state governments by their respective constitutions remain unaltered
and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States. That the intention of the framers"of
the constitution in this respect might not be misunderstood, this
rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the tenth article of
the amendments, namely: ' The powers not delegated to the
United States are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' The government of the United States can therefore claim
no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the
powers actually granted to it must be such as are expressly given,
or given by necessary implication. The general government and
the states, although both exist within the same territorial limits,
are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and inLdependently of each other within their respective spheres. The
former, in its appropriate sphere, is supreme, but the states, within
the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the
tenth amendment, 'reserved,' are as independent of the general
government as that government, in its sphere, is independent of the
states."
To the same purport are Prfield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; State
VOL. XXVI.-59
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v." Garten, 82 Ind. 1; State v. Gibson, 86 Id. 389; People v.
Brady, 40 C41. 198; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76; United
States v. ruik8shank et al., 2 Otto 542 ; Bradwell v. The State,
16 Wall. 180 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203.
Within this class, which is not granted or secured by the federal
constitution, but left to the exclusive protection of the states, is
that immense class of legislation mentioned by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Gibbon8 v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203, which embraces everything within the territory of a state not surrendered to the general
government, and which is necessary in the regulation of the police,
morals, health, internal commerce and general prosperity of a community, and which is justly subject to state regulation. See also
Commonwealth v. Kemball, 24 Pick. 850.
Mr. Justice STORY, in Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Peters 539,
says: "To guard, however, against possible misconstruction of our
views, it is proper to state that we are by no means to be understood in any manner whatever to doubt or interfere with the police
-powerbelonging to the states in virtue of their general sovereignty;
that the police power extends over all subjects within the territorial limitsof the states, and has never been conceded to the United
States."
The police power of the states is very ably discussed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Tie City of
-ew York v. Miln, 11 Peters 139. In this last case cited the
court say, "that all those powers which relate to merely munici-pal legislation, or what may more properly be called internal police,
are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that consequently, in
relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified
and exclusive."
Mr. Justice BUSKIRK, of the Supreme Court of Indiana, has so
ably discussed this question in an opinion delivered by him that, at
the expense of being tedious, we will copy a portion of what he has
said, fully endorsing the same. He says : " There can be no doubt
that Congress possesses the power to determine who may or may
hot make'contracts, and prescribe the manner of their enforcement,
in the District of Columbia, and in all other places where the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction; but we deny the
power and authority of Congress to determine who shall make contracts or the manner of enforcing them in the several states. Nor
is there any doubt that Congress may provide for the punishment
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of those who violate the laws of Congress; but we deny the power
of Congress to regulate, control, or in any manner to interfere with
the states in determining what shall constitute crimes against the
laws of the state, or the manner or extent of punishment of persons
charged and convicted with the violation of the criminal laws of a
sovereign state. In this state marriage is treated as a civil contract, but it is more than a civil contract. It is a public institution,
established by God himself, is recognised in all christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the peace, happiness and well-being
of society. In fact, society could not exist without the institution
of marriage, for upon it all the social and domestic relations are
based. The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard,
protect and preserve this God-given, civilizing and christianizing
institution, is of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered
nor can the states suffer or permit any interference therewith. If
the federal government can determine who may marry in a state,
there is no limit to its power. It can determine the rights, duties
and obligations of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian
and ward. It may pass laws regulating the granting of divorces.
It may assume, exercise and absorb all the powers of a local and
domestic character. This would result in the destruction of the
states :" The State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389.
Mr. Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce, vol. 1, 4th ed.,
sect. 87, says: "All our marriage and divorce laws, and of.course
all statutes on the subject, so far as they pertain to localities embraced within the territorial limits of the particular states, are state
laws and state statutes; the national power with us not having legislative or judicial cognizance of the matter within their localities."
Marriage is not a contract protected by the constitution of the
United States, or within the meaning of the Civil Rights Bill.
Marriage is more than a contract within the meating of the act.
It is a civil status left solely by the constitution and the laws to
the discretion of the states under their general power to regulate
their domestic affairs. The rights, obligations and duties arising
from it are not left to be regulated by the agreement of the parties,
but are matters of municipal regulation, over which the parties
have no control.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, The State v. Kennedy,
76 N. C. 251, says: "There can be no doubt of the power of every
country to make laws regulating the marriage of its subjects, to
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declare whom they may marry, and the consequences of their marrying." It is clear to our mind that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Civil Rights Bill has abrogated article 2016 of our
criminal code.
Again, the counsel for the defendant insists that because the
statute, under which the indictment was found in this case, fixes
a penalty upon the white person alone, and none upon the negro,
that it, therefore, violates the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
of the constitution of the United States and the fourth section of
the Civil Rights Bill. It is conceded by him that'if the statute
upon which this prosecution is based punished both the white person and the negro alike it would not be obnoxious to the objections
he urges against it, but would be constitutional, and clearly within
the legislative powers of the state. It is, then, conceded that the
states can prohibit the intermarriage of the races, and it therefore
follows, as the night follows the 'day, that this state can enforce
such laws as she may deem best in regard to the intermarriage of
whites and negroes in Texas, provided the punishment for its violation is not cruel or unusual. If she cannot, what is to prevent it ?
The objection to our statute that it does not punish both parties
alike should be addressed to the legislative and not to the judicial
branch of the government. Can it be truly said that the law is
illegal because the race sought to be protected by the amendments
and the Civil Rights Bill is not punished?
Civilized society has the power of self-preservation, and marriage
being the foundation of such society, most of the states in which
the negro forms an element of any note have enacted laws inhibiting the intermarriage between the white and black races; and the
courts, as a general rule, have sustained the constitutionality of
such statutes. We are aware that the Supreme Court of Alabama
has -held that a statute of that state, which prohibited the intermarriage of whites and negroes, was abrogated by the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution; but this opinion is not supported by reason or authorities: Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195.1
Has the law of this state, passed in 1858, making it a felony for
a white person to marry a negro, been repealed? We think not.
Implied repeals are not favored; nothing but a statute will repeal
IThis case

has since been explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court of Ala-

bama in Green v. 1%e. State, at the December Term 1877, not yet reported.-ED.
Am. LAW REG.
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a statute: Scdgwick on Stat. and Const. Law 96, 105. During
the period since the negroes were emancipated the law-making
power of Texas has not only failed to repeal article 2016, but the
legislature of 1866 (ch. 128, p. 131), in repealing laws "relating
to slaves and free persons of color," expressly "provided, nevertheless, that nothing herein shall be so construed as to repeal any
law prohibiting the intermarriage of the white and black races."
The constitution of 1869 (ch. 12, see. 27) legalized the marriage
of those who had been living together as husband and wife, and
both of whom, by the law of bondage, were precluded from the rites
of marriage; but this only applied to negroes. See CMements v.
Crawford, 42 Texas 601.
It has always been the policy of this state to maintain separate
marital relations between the whites and the blacks. It is useless
for us to cite the different statutes on this ubject, enacted from
time to time, showing that the people of Texas are now, and have
ever been, opposed to the intermixture of these races. Under the
police power possessed by the states, they undoubtedly, in our
judgment, have the power to pass such laws. If the people of
other states desire to have an intermixture of the white and black
races, they have the right to adopt such a policy. When the legislature of this state shall declare such a policy by positive enactment
we will enforce it; until this is done we will not give such a policy
our sanction.
The defendant moved the court to quash the indictment, because
the same does not charge any offence known to the law, and because
it does not allege that said party married a negro within the third
generation inclusive. The court properly overruled defendant's
motion to quash. By recurring to article 2016 of our Criminal
Code, it will be seen that it is made a felony for any white person
in this state to knowingly marry a negro, or a person of mixed
blood, descended from negro ancestry, to the third generation inclusive, &c. In this case the indictment charges that the defendant
was a white person, and that he knowingly married a negro.
The defendant also filed a motion in arrest of judgment. The
fifth ground set out in the motion in arrest of judgment is as follows: "Because the bill fails to charge the name of the woman,
or negro, that defendant is charged to have married." We think
the failure to describe the party by name that defendant married
should have been taken advantage of by motion to quash and not
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in arrest and that the verdict cured the omission. The offence
being charged in the terms of the statute (to the disjunctive "or"),
the indictment is good, on general exception. Had the exception
been taken before the trial, it should have been sustained. A motion in arrest ofjudgment reaches substantial defects only: Pas. Dig.,
art. 3143. There are only three grounds of exception to the substance of an indictment in the Code, and the above is not one of
them: Pas. Dig., art. 2954. Exceptions to matters not of substance must be taken before the trial by motion to quash, not by
motion in arrest: Terrel v. The State, 41 Tex. 464; State v.
Williams, 43 Id. 502; 1 Court of App., Hancock v. The State,
Id. 857; Long v. The State, Id. 466. The certainty required in
an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the
same offence: Pas. Dig., art. 2865. Had the name been given
the state would have been held to prove it as- alleged; but, if not
given, and no motion to quash on this account, then, in a subsequent
prosecution, the defendant, under a plea of autre fois convict or
acquit, could introduce evidence aliunde to identify the transaction:
C6cok v. Bumly, 45 Tex. 97. An indictment might be so framed
by the pleader, in cases like this, as to meet the proof on trial by
having two counts in it. The first count charging that the defendant married a negro, and the second count charging that he married
a person of mixed blood descended from a negro within the third
generation, inclusive, from said negro.
The District Court properly admitted in evidence the marriage
certificate, with the return thereon of the minister who performed
the marriage ceremony. The state did not rely, however, upon
this marriage certificate alone to prove the marriage, but submitted
to the jury the testimony of a person who was present and witnessed
the marriage. The evidence shows that the defendant was married
to one Mrs. Lettice Howell, in the county of Gregg, about the time
charged in the indictment. The first witness introduced by the
state "described Lettice Howell as having kinky hair, a flat nose,
thick lips, of gingerbread complexion, nearly black, and that she
was known by everybody as a negro." Upon cross-examination
the witness said "he thought she had white blood in her."
Emma Oliver, another state's witness, on her cross-examination,
testified that she knew Lettice Howell had white blood in her.
These were the only witnesses examined on this point.

